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-iQUESTION PRESENTED
Doesthe cost-shifting provision of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B),
provides that a court may"awardreasonable attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs to the parents" whoare prevailing parties,
authorize an awardof expert costs?
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
RespondentsPearl and TheodoreMurphyare the parents of
JosephMurphy,a child with disabilities. TheIndividuals with
Disabilities EducationAct (IDEA),20 U.S.C. 1400-1487(2000),
obligates schooldistricts to providechildren with disabilities a
"free appropriate public education." Id. 1412(a)(1). When
Murphysand petitioner ArlingtonCentral SchoolDistrict Board
of Educationreachedan impasseover the appropriate educational
placement for Joe, the Murphysinvoked IDEA’sdue process
provision and prevailed. TheMurphyscould not have succeeded
withouttheir educationalexpert’s assistance.
The question before the Court is whether IDEA’scostshifting provision, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B), authorizes
Murphys
to recover the cost of their expert’s participation. The
answer is yes. The text, history, and purpose of Section
1415(i)(3)(B) demonstrate that it empowerscourts to
parents the costs of experts. BecauseCongressauthorized these
awards, petitioner’s contention that West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499U.S. 83 (1991), controls this case
misses the mark.
Theevidencethat Congressauthorizedprevailing parents to
recover expert costs is overwhelming.CongressaddedSection
1415(i)(3)(B) to IDEAin 1986 whenit enacted the Handicapped
Children’s Protection Act (HCPA)
to overturn Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992 (1984). Smith had held that attorneys’ fees were
unavailableto prevailing parents underthe then-current version
of IDEA.Congressrespondedin the HCPA
first by authorizing
awardsof"attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents" in
Section 1415(i)(3)(B). Then, in a provision of the
petitioner disregards, Congressunderscoredthat the phrase "the
costs to the parents" includes expert costs by directing the
General AccountingOffice (GAO)to report on the "attorneys’
fees, costs, and expensesawarded"to prevailing parents and "the

2
numberof hours spent by personnel, including attorneys and
consultants" in IDEAproceedings. P.L. 99-372, § 4(b)(3),
Stat. 796, 797-98 (1986). Taken together, these provisions
demonstratethat Congressused "costs" in its ordinary sense -to cover the expenses parents incur in IDEAproceedings,
including the costs of consultants and experts -- and not as a
restrictive legal termof art.
The history of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s implementation
confirms this reading. Courts uniformly understood IDEAto
permit awardsof expert costs. TheGAO
Report recognizedthat
expert costs were recoverable. And during Congress’
deliberations on the HCPA,
there wasbipartisan consensusthat
prevailing parents should recover the costs of experts -- a
consensusreflected in uncontradictedstatements in the House,
the Senate, and the ConferenceReport.
TheMurphys’
readingof the statute gives effect to the text of
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) and is consistent with IDEA’score
providingchildren with disabilities a free, appropriate public
education.Thesamecannotbe said of petitioner’s interpretation,
whichrewrites Section 1415(i)(3)(B) to provide for attorneys’
fees and nothing more, and precludes parents from recovering
expert costs, eventhoughthey needexpert assistanceto vindicate
their right to participate in IDEAproceedings. Petitioner’s
readingthus imperils the fair resolution of due processhearings
and subverts IDEA’score goal of ensuring that children with
disabilities receivean educationthat is both appropriateand free.

3
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Petitioner’s rendition of the statutes involvedomits relevant
provisions of the HCPA,P.L. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796, which
amended IDEA.
HCPASection 2 (codified
! 415(i)(3)(B)) provided:

as amended at 20 U.S.C.

In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, mayaward
reasonableattorneys’ fees as part of the costs to
the parent or guardian of a handicappedchild or
youth whois the prevailing party.
HCPA
Section 3 (codified as amendedat 20 U.S.C. 1415(/))
(citation omitted)provided:
Nothingin this title shall be construedto restrict
or limit the rights, procedures, or remedies
available under the Constitution, title Vof the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal
statutes protecting the rights of handicapped
children and youth * * * *
HCPA
Section 4, reprinted in 20 U.S.C. 1415note (citation

IDEAwas reauthorized and amendedin 2004. P.L. 108-446, 118 Stat.
2647. The operative language of the cost-shifting provision was not
materially changed. It nowreads: "In any action or proceeding brought
under this section, the court, in its discretion, mayaward reasonable
attorneys’ fees as part of the costs - (I) to a prevailing party whois the
parent of a child with a disability .... " 20 U.S.C.A.1415(i)(3)(B)
2005). Petitioner does not contend that this changeis significant. Unless
otherwise noted, citations are to the 2000United States Code.
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omitted), provides:
(a) TheComptrollerGeneralof the UnitedStates,
through the General AccountingOffice, shall
conducta study of the impactof the amendments
to the Education of the HandicappedAct made
undersection 2 of this Act * * * *
(b) Thereport authorized under subsection (a)
shall include the followinginformation:* * * *
(3) Data, for a geographically
representativeselective sampleof States,
indicating (A) the specific amount
attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses
awardedto the prevailing party, in each
action and proceeding under section
615(e)(4)(B) from the date
enactmentof this Act throughfiscal year
1988, and the range of such fees, costs,
and expensesawardedin the actions and
proceedings under such section,
categorized by type of complaintand (B)
for the samesampleas in (A) the number
of hours spent by personnel, including
attorneysand consultants,involvedin the
action or proceeding, and expenses
incurred by the parents and the State
educational agencyand local educational
agency,
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In 1986, Congress added the relevant statutory text to IDEA
by enacting the HCPA. The HCPAand its history are discussed
in detail below. To put the dispute between the Murphys and
Arlington Central in context,
however, we provide a brief
2overview of IDEA.
IDEA was enacted to address Congress’ concern that "more
than one-half of the children with disabilities in the United States
do not receive appropriate services." 20 U.S.C. 1400(c)(2)(B).
It sought to ensure "that all children with disabilities
have

2 IDEA’sroots trace back to the Education of the HandicappedAct
(EHA),P.L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970), which was Congress’ first effort
to address the needs of children with disabilities. But EHAdid not stem
the tide of overt discrimination in education against these children.
Parents and civil rights groups beganturning to the federal courts, where
they wonsubstantial relief in two path-breaking decisions: Mills v. Board
of Educationof the Distric t of Columbia,348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)
and Pennsylvania Ass ’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC),
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa 1972).
The courts in these cases concluded (PARCthrough a consent decree) that
systematic discrimination against children with disabilities in the
provision of public education violated the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.Mills, 348 F. Supp. at
875; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 279. The courts ordered an end to
discrimination and entered broad injunctive relief. Id. In the wake of
these decisions, Congress substantially overhauled the EHAwith the
passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(E.AHCA),P.L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. For a detailed history of the
statute’s early evolution, including the impact these cases had on the
EAHCA,see Hendrik Hudson Central School District ~ Board of
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-80 (1982). In 1990, Congress
changed the title of the statute to the Individuals with Disabilities
EducationAct. P.L. 101-476, § 901(a)(1), (3), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42.

available to thema free appropriatepublic education"and "that
the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected." Id. 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B).As this
has recognized, IDEA"confers upon disabled students an
enforceablesubstantiveright to public education."Honigv.Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 310 (1984); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180,
192-200.
Twoprovisions of IDEAare relevant here. First, Section
1414sets forth proceduresto identify and evaluatechildren with
disabilities and determine what constitutes an appropriate
education. Oncea child with disabilities has beenidentified,
IDEArequires the school district to prepare an "individualized
educational program"(IEP) that, amongother things, describes
the educationaland related services to be providedto the child,
establishes annual goals to assess whetherthe child is making
progress, and determines the child’s appropriate educational
placement. 20 U.S.C. 1414(d). Congressintended parents
participate in the development of their child’s IEP. Id.
1414(d)(1)(B)(i).
Second,anticipating that disagreementswouldarise between
parents and schools, Section 1415 establishes procedural
protections that must be afforded to the parties. Parents are
entitled to written notice whenevera school either proposesor
refuses "to initiate or change"a child’s IEP.Id. 1415(b)(3).If
impassearises over any elementof the IEP, parentshavethe right
to "an impartial due process hearing." Id. 1415(f)(1).
process hearings are initiated by the submissionof a formal
complaint,to whichthe school mustrespond.Id. 1415(b)(6)-(7).
In the eventthat disputeresolutionfails, a dueprocesshearingis
held before an impartial hearing officer independent of the
school. Id. 1415(f)(1),

Section 1415also establishes a numberof "safeguards" to
ensureproceduralfairness during hearings. Parties have"theright
to be accompanied
and advisedby counseland by individuals with
special knowledgeor training with respect to the problemsof
childrenwith disabilities." Id. 1415(h)(1).In practice, parents
often unrepresentedby counselin IDEAhearings, althoughschool
districts generallyhavecounsel)Parties have"the fight to present
evidenceand confront, cross-examine,and compelthe attendance
of witnesses." Id. 1415(h)(2).Acompletetranscript or recording
must be madeof the hearing and providedto parents on request,
and findings of facts and decisions must be in writing. Id.
1415(h)(3)-(4).In states like NewYork,whichopt for a two-tier
system, adverserulings maybe appealedto the state educational
agency. Id. 1415(g).
Anyparty aggrieved by the results of the administrative
process mayfile suit in either federal or state court. Id.
1415(i)(2)(A). Judicial reviewis basedon the record of the
processhearing, with limited opportunityfor supplementation.
Id.
1415(i)(2)(B). Courts generally resolve IDEAcases on summary
judgment, even whenevidence compiledduring the due process
hearing is conflicting. See, e.g., Beth B. v. VanClay, 282F.3d
493,496n.2 (7th Cir. 42002).
3 See 150 Cong. Rec. $5351(daily ed. May12, 2004) (reporting that
parents are represented by counsel in about one-third of the due process
hearings held in NewYorkand Illinois, while school districts havelawyers
in virtually all cases); see also Am.Bar Ass’n, Comm’non Nonlawyer
Practice, NonlawyerActivity in Law Related Situations: A Report with
Recommendations
81 (1995) (reporting that "[i]n manycommunitiesthere
appear to be few, if any, lawyers experienced or willing to handle" IDEA
cases for parents).
4 Rowleyheld that courts must give "due weight" to the findings of
the state administrative proceeding and should not "substitute their own
(continued...)

B. Proceedings

Below

51. The Murphys’ son Joe is a child with learning disabilities.
The Murphys live in upstate New York and have modest means,
’with a total income of around $47,000. 6 This controversy arose
in September 1997, when Joe was in eighth grade. At the
beginning of the school year, a speech/language specialist found
Joe to be "severely functionally
language disordered."
SRO
Decision at 6. A neuropsychologist
also evaluated Joe and
reported that he had a "near total incapacity to process language,
written or oral." Id. At the end of eighth grade, Arlington
Central’s speech/language evaluator concluded that Joe was a

(...continued)
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities
they review." 458 U.S. at 206; see also Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of
Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 2004); L.B. v. NeboSch. Dist.,
379 F.3d 966, 974 (10th Cir. 2004). Ordinarily, parties are not permitted
to supplement the record or to have witnesses testify in review
proceedings unless they can showprejudice or that the evidence was
unavailable at the time of the state hearing. See, e.g., West Platte R-II
Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, No. 05-1973, 2006WL488410, at *2 (8th Cir. Mar.
2, 2006); Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir.
1998); Townof Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773 (lst Cir.
1984).
5 This recitation is drawn from the decision of the State Review
Officer (SRO), whichis in the record (see Exhibit
A to the Status Repor
t
filed by Arlington Central on Dec. 28, 1999 (Docket Entry 8)), and
available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/1999/99-065.htm(last visited on
Mar. 22, 2006) (SRODecision).
6 See Joint Appendixin Murphyv. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Edue., CV-00-7358,297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002), at 19 (certification
Pearl Murphy,dated Aug.6, 1999, attached to plaintiff’s motion to show
cause, dated Sept. 7, 1999); id. at 110(transcript of hearing on plaintiff’s
showcause motion in Murphyv. Arlington Cent. Seh. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
No. CV-99-1258(Sept. 7, 1999)).
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"high risk" student both academically and emotionally and
recommendedthat he be placed in a residential school for
languageimpairedstudents. Id. 7at 8.
Arlington Central nonetheless proposed an IEP that would
place Joe in ArlingtonHighSchoolin classes with other students
with disabilities.
Id. at 9. To help them evaluate Joe’s
educational options, the Murphysretained Marilyn Arons, an
educator whohas workedon special education matters since
1963.s Arons reviewed Joe’s evaluations, conducted her own
assessment, attended IEP meetingsand met with school officials
to urge Arlington Central to provide Joe with moreintensive
speech/languagetraining. Id. WhenArlington Central failed to
do so, the Murphys
enrolled Joe in the KildonanSchool,a private
school for learning disabled students. At the sametime, the
Murphysfiled an IDEAadministrative complaint pro se seeking
a due process hearing to establish Kildonanas Joe’s appropriate
placement and to compel Arlington Central to reimburse his
tuition. Id.
TheMurphys
did not havecounselat the due process hearing,
which stretched over six days in October 1998 and was

7 Joe’s problems in school had started years earlier. He had
"attention difficulties"
in kindergarten, he was "diagnosed by a
neurologist as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder" in second
grade, and he had to repeat third grade. SRODecision at 1-2. By fourth
grade, Joe was classified as "learning disabled." Id. at 3. The SRO
Decisiongives a full accountof Joe’s difficulties in school. Id. at 1-6.
s Arons holds a masters degree in early childhood education and had
been qualified as an expert in prior proceedings. Boroughof PalmyraBd.
ofEduc, v. R.C., No. 97-6199, 31 IDELR¶ 3 (D.N.J. 1999); see Pet. App.
at 21a-22a, 35a.
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reconvenedfor several moredays in April 1999. Id. 9at 9-10.
ArlingtonCentral had counsel. Id. Aronsdid not testify at the
hearingbut did assist the Murphys
in reviewingJoe’s educational
evaluations,framingquestionsfor the school board’sexperts, and
preparing their affirmative case. JA 23a-28a; 63a-66a.OnJuly
7, 1999, the impartial hearing officer held that the Kildonan
School, not Arlington High School, was the appropriate
placementfor Joe. SRODecision at 9-10. The ruling required
Arlington Central to reimburse the tuition the Murphyshad
already paid for the 1998-1999school year. Id. Arlington
Central appealed to the State ReviewOfficer (SRO)on August
18, 1999, thereby staying the reimbursement
order.
2. Meanwhile,the start of the 1999-2000school year was
approachingand the Murphys
could not afford to continue to pay
Joe’s tuition. Still proceedingpro
se, the Murphys
filed an action
in district court to require ArlingtonCentralto pay Joe’s tuition
while its appeal to the SROwas pending. Before the district
court ruled, the SROaffirmed. Id at 13-16. Arlington Central
did not reimbursethe Murphys
for the 1998-1999tuition until the
district court issued a showcause order in late January2000--

9 NewYorklaw permits non-lawyersto assist parents to advocatetheir
claims in due process hearings. SRODecision at 9. Arons helped the
Murphysin this capacity as well. Id. Arons’ certification, submitted in
support of the Murphys’request for costs, makesclear that compensation
wassought only for those services renderedin her capacity as an expert in
special education matters, not as an advocate. JA at 20a-33a; 63a-66a. In
so doing, Arons followed the line between compensable and noncompensable activities drawn in Arons v. NewJersey State Board of
Education, 842 F.2d 58, 62-63 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding educational expert
mayreceive fees as an expert consultant or witness, but maynot for legal
services).
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halfwayinto the next school year.l°
Theparties remaineddivided over Joe’s placement(and the
liability for his tuition) for the 1999-2000school year. To
resolve that issue, the Murphysrequested a newdue process
hearing and, in the still-pending district court action, invoked
IDEA’s"stay put" provision to require ArlingtonCentral to pay
Joe’s tuition. TheMurphyscontendedthat the SRO’sruling had
changedJoe’s IEP to provide that his placementwas Kildonan;
Arlington Central arguedthat the SRO’sruling applied only to
the prior school year. Thedistrict court agreedwith the Murphys
and directedArlingtonCentralto pay Joe’s tuition pendinga final
determination of the Murphys’IDEAclaim. Murphyv. Arlington
Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358-359
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). The Second Circuit affirmed. 297 F.3d 195
11
(2d Cir. 2002).
3.a. Following that ruling, with all other issues now
resolved, the Murphysfiled a motionin the district court to
recover$29,350for the services that Aronsprovidedas an expert.

lo See Murphyv. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. CV-999294 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000). Arlington Central challenged the SRO’s
decisionin state court and lost. See In re ArlingtonCent. Sch. Dist. v. State
Review Officer, Index No. 1212/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dutchess County,
Sept. 13, 2002).
H The Murphys had counsel on the 2002 appeal to the Second
Circuit. As noted, they proceeded pro se in all other proceedings. The
undersignedcounsel of record participated as counsel for amici in support
of the Murphys’position in the 2005 Second Circuit appeal and became
counsel for the Murphysafter Arlington Central filed its petition for
certiorari.
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JAat 20a-33a; 63a-66a.12 The district court accepted Arons’
qualifications as "’a professionaleducator[who]... specializes
in curriculumdevelopmentfor exceptional children.’" Pet. App.
21a (quoting Arons, 842 F.2d at 62-63). But it cut the request
substantially, not becausethe Murphyssought compensationfor
Arons’advocacyefforts as petitioner suggests, but becauseher
services as an expert were rendered either before the
commencement
of the due process hearing (September1998)
after the district court’s initial ruling in the Murphys’favor
(March 2000). In the court’s view, only services provided
between these two events were rendered in an "action or
proceeding,"as IDEArequires. Id. at 37a-38a.Thejudge added,
"nothingI havesaid in this opinionor the result I havereached
should be regardedas a denigrationofMarilynArons’sabilities
or the devoted services she rendered to the Murphyfamily. I
haveno doubt that those services wereworthover $29,000."Id.
at 41a-42a.
The district court found that Arons spent 43.25 hours
assisting the Murphysprepare for and participate in the due
process hearing. Id. at 38a. Thecourt concludedthat Arons’
workhelping the Murphysunderstand the submissions of the
school board’s experts, reviewingtechnical materials that would
be relied on in the hearing, and formulatingquestions to use in
cross-examining the school board’s experts, qualified as
reimbursableexpert costs. Id. at 22a, 39a-40a.Finding$200per
hour a propervaluationofArons’expert services, id. at 40a-41a,
the court awardedthe Murphys$8,650. Id. at 41a. Arlington
Central appealed; the Murphysdid not cross appeal.

~2 For reasons not apparent in the record, the Murphysdid not seek
reimbursementfor the costs of the services provided by Gerald Brooks, a
speech/languagepathologist, whoprepared a report and testified on their
behalf. SRODecision,at 11-12.
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3.b. The SecondCircuit affirmed, holding that the IDEA
authorizescourts to awardexpert costs to prevailingparents. Pet.
App.at 2a. It first examinedthis Court’s rulings in Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,Inc., 482U.S. 437 (1987), and West
VirginiaUniversityHospitals, Inc. v. Casey,499 U.S. 83 (1991),
whichheld that, unless Congressspecifies otherwise,a statutory
authorizationfor attorneys’ fees doesnot encompass
expert costs.
Pet. App.at 8a-9a. Thecourt notedthat, in contrast to 42 U.S.C.
1988, the statute at issue in Casey, Congresshad left no doubt
that expert costs were to be reimbursedto prevailing parents
under the IDEA.Pet. App.at 9a-10a. This conclusion wasbased
in part on the Joint Statement of the Conferees, which made
explicit that expert costs wererecoverableunderIDEA.Id. at 9a.
Thecourt also observedthat "[e]xpert testimonyis often critical
in IDEAcases, which are fact-intensive inquiries about the
child’s disability and the effectiveness of the measuresschool
boards have offered to secure a free appropriate public
education." Id. at 12a. Theavailability of expert costs would
thus be in keeping with IDEA’s remedial purpose. Id. at
13a-14a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Thequestionin this case is whetherparents like the Murphys
mayrecover the costs of the expert whoassisted themin a due
process hearing involvingthe highest stakes imaginable-- their
child’s future. Thestatute’s text, history, andpurposeall point to
the conclusionthat IDEAauthorizes prevailing parents to recover
expert costs.
I. IDEAprovides that "in any action or proceedingbrought"
underthe Act, "the court, in its discretion, mayawardreasonable
attorneys’fees as part of the costs to the parentsof a child with
a disability...." 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B) (emphasisadded).
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most natural reading of the phrase "the costs to the parents"
encompassesall expenses parents incur in IDEAproceedings,
includingthe cost of experts.
This reading is confirmedby Congress’direction to the GAO
to studythe legislation’s fiscal impactandto report to Congress
on the "amountof the attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses"
awarded in IDEAlitigation,
as well as the number of
compensable
hour’s spent by "attorneys and consultants" involved
in the proceeding. This instruction wouldmakeno sense unless
Congressintended expert consultants to be reimbursed. The
GAO
Reportstates that "[e]xpert witness fees" are "examplesof
reimbursableexpenses" under the Act.
This reading also gives substance to IDEA’soverarching
goals of ensuringthat children with disabilities are provided"a
free appropriatepublic education"and that the rights of children
and parents are safeguarded. Reading IDEA’scost-shifting
provision to exclude expert costs wouldbe manifestly at odds
with the Act’s requirement that schools provide a "free"
education. See, e.g., BurlingtonSch. Comm.v. Mass. Dep’t of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). Parents needexpert assistance
to challengeschooldeterminations,Schaffer v. Weast,126S. Ct.
528,536(2005), but manyparents cannot afford to pay experts.
If costs for expertsare unavailable,theseparentswill be deprived
of their fight to challengeschooldecisionsthat denytheir child’s
right to an appropriate education, a result Congresscould not
have possibly intended. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
Petitioner’s readingviolates severalcardinalrules of statutory
construction. Petitioner analyzes the languageof IDEAthrough
the lens of 42 U.S.C.1988,eventhoughthe twostatutes are quite
different in languageand purpose.Petitioner arguesthat Section
1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes the awardonly att orneys’ fee s,
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therebyrenderingthe phrase"as part of the costs to the parents"
meaningless. Andpetitioner’s reading underminesIDEA’sgoals
by precluding parents from recovering the costs of expert
assistance, even thoughthat assistance is essential to the fair
resolution of IDEAdue process hearings.
II. Thehistory of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s implementation
confirmsthat Congressauthorizedparents to recoverexpert costs.
TheGAO
read it in that manner.Andcourts uniformlyheld that
it empowered
them to award expert costs. Indeed, for fil~een
years following Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s enactment, courts
nearly unanimousin holding that it provides for the paymentof
expert costs. This history belies petitioner’s central claimthat
Section 1415(i)(3)(B)"unambiguously"
fails to authorize
to awardexpert costs to prevailing parents.
The drafting history of the HCPA
reaffirms that Congress
authorized the awardof expert costs to parents. Althoughthere
were controversial issues that slowedthe HCPA’s
passage, there
was bipartisan agreement in both Houses at every stage of
Congress’deliberations that prevailing parents should recover
expert costs. The Joint Statement crystallizes Congress’
judgment:"Theconfereesintend that the term ’attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs’ include reasonableexpensesand fees of expert
witnessesand the reasonablecosts of any test or evaluationwhich
is foundnecessaryto the preparation of" the parents’ case, "as
well as traditional costs incurred in the course of litigating a
case." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986).
III. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, nothing in Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), or West
Virginia UniversityHospitals, Inc. v. Casey,499U.S. 83 (1991),
informs the meaningof Section 1415(i)(3)(B). Casey involved
statutes that are different in text and languagefromIDEA,andthe
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HCPA
wasenactedbeforeeither case wasdecided. "[Courts] are
to read the wordsof [statutory] text as any ordinary Member
of
Congresswouldhave read them." Chisomv. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see MCITelecomms.
Corp. v. AT&TCo.,512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994). Nothing in the
language or history of the HCPA
suggests that the "ordinary
Member[s]of Congress" whoparticipated in its enactment
anticipated the narrow,term-of-art meaningthese later rulings
gaveto the phrase"attorneys’ fees as part of costs." This point
takes on special force becauseCaseyrejected the argument(not
presented here) that expert fees are recoverableas part of the
attorneys’fees parties incurin federalcourt litigation, not as part
of the "the costs ... parents" incur in state administrative
proceedings.
Nor does Casey’s rationale apply to IDEA.Caseyheld that
28 U.S.C. 1821(b) and 1920 -- which fix compensation for
witnesses in federal court proceedings-- governexpert fees in
civil rights cases becauseCongressdid not express an intent to
repeal these provisions whenit enactedSection 1988. 499 U.S.
at 83. But Casey’s repeal-by-implication rationale has no
application to IDEA.Sections 1821 and 1920 apply only in
federal court actions, not in state due process proceedings.If
accepted, petitioner’s argumentwoulddeprive parents of any
opportunity to recover the costs they incur in due process
hearings-- a result flatly at oddswith Congress’clear intent.
IV. Petitioner’s invocation of the Spending Clause is
untimely,incorrect, and besidethe point. It wasnot raised below
and thus is forfeited. It is incorrect becauseneither the HCPA
nor
IDEAis exclusively a SpendingClausestatute. See, e.g., Cedar
Rapids County Sch. Dist. v. Garrett F., 526 U.S. 66, 76-77
(1999); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369; Rowley,458 U.S. at 180,
192-200.Andit is beside the point becausethe SpendingClause
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requires Congress to give states fair notice of their fiscal
obligations when they accept federal grants. Section
1415(i)(3)(B)did just
ARGUMENT
I. The Text of IDEAConfirmsThat Expert Costs May
Be RecoveredBy Prevailing Parents.
A. Section 1415(i)(3)(B) Authorizes the Paymentof
Costs.
1. Statutory languageis the starting point in any case of
statutory construction. Leocalv. Ashcrofi, 543U.S. 1, 8 (2004).
Section 1415(i)(3)(B)of IDEAprovides that, "[i]n any action
proceedingbroughtunderthis section, the court, in its discretion,
mayawardreasonableattorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the
parentsof a child with a disability whois the prevailing party."
(emphasisadded).
Statutory languageshouldbe given its most natural reading.
Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S. Ct. 1561, 1568 (2005); see also
Chisom,501U.S. at 405(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Ourjob begins
with a text that Congresshas passedandthe Presidenthas signed.
Weare to read the wordsof that text as any ordinary Member
of
Congress would have read them ... and apply the meaningso
determined.")(citation omitted). Readin this light, the words
"attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents" authorize
reimbursementof all costs parents incur in IDEAproceedings,
including expert costs. Thelanguageis categorical. Thereis no
textual basis for distinguishingthe cost of hiring an expert from
any other cost parents incur in IDEAproceedings.Expert costs,
like attorneys’ fees, are indisputably"part of the costs" parents
incur in an action or proceeding brought under IDEA.Experts
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are not providedto parents free-of-charge under IDEA.Norare
experts goodSamaritans whovolunteer their services without
compensation. Reading IDEA’stext in accordance with its
"ordinary or natural reading," Leocal, 543U.S. at 1, 9 (2004),
yields only one conclusion: Expert costs are reimbursable
because they are "part of the costs to the parents." See also
ConsumerElecs. Ass ’n v. FCC,347 F.3d 291,298 (D.C. Cir.
2003)("[S]tatutes written in broad, sweepinglanguageshould
givenbroad, sweepingapplication") (citation omitted).
2. TheGAOreport provision confirmsthis reading. In the
HCPA,Congress directed the GAOto study and report on the
"attorneys’ fees, costs, and expensesawardedto the prevailing
party" in a representative sample of states, and to include
information about "the numberof hours spent by personnel,
including attorneys and consultants, involved in the action or
proceeding." P.L. 99-372, § 4(b)(3), 100 Stat. 796, 797-98
(1986) (emphasisadded).
This Courthas repeatedlystressed that the "[i]nterpretation
of a wordor phrase dependsuponreading the wholestatutory
text, considering the purposeand context of the statute, and
consultingany precedentsor authorities that informthe analysis."
Dolan v. United States, ~3
126 S. Ct. 1252, 1257 (2006).
Nonetheless, petitioner and the United States ignore this
provision, even though it sheds considerable light on Section
1415(i)(3)(B). Byinstructing the GAO
to study the "attorneys’
fees, costs and expenses"awardedin IDEAcases, including the
time spent by "attorneys and consultants," Congresssignaledthat

13 See also KoonsBuick Pontiac GMC,Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60
(2004)("Statutory constructionis a ’holistic endeavor.")(citations omitted);
Leocal, 543U.S. at 9 ("[T]he Courtconstrues languagein its context and in
light of the termssurroundingit.").
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it expectedSection 1415(i)(3)(B) to be read broadlyto
these expenses. Indeed, Congress’direction to the GAO
would
be inexplicableif Congressdid not anticipatethat the expenses
for "consultants" wouldbe recoverable. The GAO
certainly
understood
the statutein that way.Its Reportstates that"[e]xpert
witnessfees, costs of tests or evaluationsfoundto be necessary
duringthe case, andcourt costs for services renderedduring
administrative and court proceedings are examples of
reimbursableexpenses"underthe Act. U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Special Education:TheAttorneyFeesProvisionof Public
Law99-372 14
13 (Nov. 1989) (GAOReport).
3.

Petitioner also fails to grapple with Section 1415(/)

~4 Congress’ use of "consultant" rather than "expert" is readily
understood. Congressintended that the phrase "the costs to the parents"
reach not only expert costs, but also "expenses"and the costs of tests and
evaluations associated with the developmentof the IEP. Thus, Congress
used the term "consultant" to ensure that the GAO
also Studied the costs
to parents of having these tests administered and evaluated and that other
services rendered by non-testifying
experts were reimbursed.
Dictionaries define the terms as synonyms.See, e.g., Webster’s Third
NewInternational Dictionary 490 (1981 ed.). Petitioner contends that
because Arons did not testify at the due process hearing, her services
would be non-compensableeven if the Murphysprevail. Pet. Br. at 30
n. 12. This Court denied certiorari on this issue, but petitioner’s argument
is without merit in any event. Section 4 of the HCPArecognizes that
"expenses" and the cost of "consultants" wouldbe reimbursed. The Joint
Statement accompanying the HCPAalso identifies
as compensable
expensesexpert witness fees, costs of tests and evaluations, and all other
litigation costs and expenses reasonably expendedby the parents, which
plainly includes consultant fees. Finally, courts have routinely
reimbursedparents for the costs of non-testifying experts. See, e.g., Bd.
ofEduc, v. Summers, 358 F. Supp. 2d 462, 473 (D. Md. 2005); Lamoine
Seh. Comm.v. Ms. Z, 353 F. Supp. 2d 18, 44 (D. Me. 2005); Noyes v.
GrossmontUnionHigh Sch. Dist., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251 (S.D. Cal.
2004); Turton v. Crisp CountySch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 1535, 1540 (M.D.
Ga. 1988).
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(Section 3 of the HCPA),which overturned Smith by providing
that claims under the Constitution and the Civil Rights and
Rehabilitation Acts maybe joined with claims under IDEA.This
provision is significant because, at the time the HCPA
was
enacted,it wasunderstoodthat courts couldawardexpert costs in
Civil Rights and RehabilitationAct cases. See Bradleyv. City of
RichmondSch.Bd., 416 U.S. 696,706-710 (1974). Thus, from
the vantage point of the Congressthat enacted the HCPA,
the
ordinary usage of the word"costs" wouldhave subsumedthe
costs of experts.
B. IDEA’sKey Substantive Provisions Confirmthat Expert
Costs MayBe Awardedto Prevailing Parents.
Theconclusionthat expert costs are reimbursableis also in
keeping with IDEA’soverarching goals: (1) to ensure that
children with disabilities receive a "free appropriate public
education"and (2) to safeguardthe rights of parents to challenge
school decisions that adversely affect their child. This Court
routinely looks to IDEA’s"overall statutory scheme" in
interpreting its provisions.See, e.g., GarretF., 526U.S. at 73;
see generally KoonsBuick, 543U.S. at 60.
1. IDEA’score goal is to assure that "all children with
disabilities haveavailable to them.., a free appropriatepublic
education." 20 U.S.C. 1400(c). This assurance is deeply
ingrainedin the Act. See, e.g., id. 1400(d)(1)(A),1412(a)(1)(A),
1415(a); see also 1401(8)(A)(defining "free appropriatepublic
education" as one "provided at public expense" and "without
charge"); 1401(25) (defining "special education" to
"specially designedinstruction, at no cost to parents"). This
Court has faithfully implementedCongress’instruction that an
appropriate educationbe providedto children with disabilities
"without charge" and "at no cost to parents." For instance, in
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GarretF.,526 U.S. at 73, andIrving IndependentSchoolDistrict
v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883,888-91(1986), the Court invokedIDEA’s
commitment
to a J?ee appropriate education in construing the
"related services" provisionto require schoolsto providenursing
care to students, notwithstandingthe expense.Id.
InBurlington,the Court relied on IDEA’spromiseof a "free"
appropriate educationin interpreting IDEA’sgrant of equitable
authority. 471 U.S. at 368-70. Burlington held that this
provision empoweredcourts to require school districts to
reimburseparents for the costs of unilateral placementsin private
schools if the court ultimately determinesthat such placement
was warranted under the Act. Id. Then-Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion for a unanimousCourt makesexactly the point that the
Murphysmakehere, emphasizing that it would be "an empty
victory" for parents to pay for the placementbut "to havea court
tell themseveral years later that they werefight but that these
expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursedby the
schoolofficials." Id. at 370. Sucha result wouldbe at oddswith
"the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the
parents’ fight to participate fully in developinga properIEP, and
all of the procedural safeguards" built into the Act, a result
"Congressundoubtedlydid not intend." Id. at 360, 370; see also
Florence CountySch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 11-14
(1993); Rowley,458 U.S. at 188-92.
Thesamelogic applies here. Apartfrom attorneys’ fees, the
most significant expense parents incur in IDEAcases is the
retentionof an expert andthe cost of the tests and evaluationsthe
expert performs. For parents like the Murphys
whocannot afford
counsel, expert costs are the most significant expense. The
availability of experts to enable parents to contest adverse
decisions is essential to the fair resolution of due process
hearings. If parents like Pearl and TedMurphycannot recover
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the costs of experts, IDEA’sguarantees of both a free and
appropriatepublic education wouldbe substantially eroded, if
not altogether eliminated.
2. IDEAalso seeks to enable parents to challenge school
decisionsthat adverselyaffect their child. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.
1400(d)(1), 1412, 1414, 1415; Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
Parents in IDEA
proceedingsare fighting for their child’s future.
Unlikelitigants in other civil rights actions, parents whowin
IDEAcases generally collect no monetary compensationand
there is no recoverythat can be usedto offset the expensesof an
expert. Theavailability of fees for experts is an indispensable
element of IDEA’sremedial scheme.
Expert assistance is pivotal to parents in IDEAcases. Due
process hearings turn on questions involving the nature and
extent of the child’s disability andthe suitability of the measures
the school district proposesto providethe child an appropriate
education. See SRODecision at 11-13; see also Deal v.
HamiltonCountyBd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 850-51(6th Cir.
2004); T.R. v. KingwoodTwp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572,
577-78(3d Cir. 2000); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204,
1216(3d Cir. 1993). Considerthe viewof District JudgePratt,
sitting by designation, in his dissent in NeoshoR-V School
District v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022(8th Cir. 2003). Judge Pratt
noted that schools "employmanyeducation and child experts"
and "[a]s one mightexpect," in due process hearings they "look
to their in house experts to testify on behalf of the school
district’s position." Id. at 1036.Parents"wholack the resources
to hire an expert witnessto evaluateandtestify on behalfof their
child" are at a serious disadvantage,and the "school district’s
expert, therefore, goes unchallenged,"doomingthe child’s case.
Id. To "denya prevailingparent the right to recoverthe fees paid
to an expert witness forecloses the likelihood that many
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underprivilegedchildren will receive the free appropriatepublic
educationto whichthey are entitled." Id. at 1036-37.15
Becauseof the resource imbalance,the playing field in IDEA
due process hearings tilts decidedly in favor of schools.
Burlington, 471U.S. at 368. Schaffer holds that, unless a state
provides otherwise, parents bear the burden of proof in IDEA
hearings challengingthe appropriatenessof IEPs. 126 S. Ct. at
528. Schaffer’s premiseis that IDEAbearings are structured to
"ensure that the school bears no uniqueinformationaladvantage."
Id. at 537. But the problem parents face is not so muchan
informationaldeficit as an expert deficit. Schooldistricts haveon
staff teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, and other
specialists -- all of whom
qualify as, and maytestify as, experts.
Parents, in contrast, haveto retain experts to challengeschool
district decisions.See id. at 536.
Relyingon Schaffer, petitioner and the UnitedStates suggest
that the imbalancein access to experts is addressed by IDEA’s
requirementthat schools provide parents an opportunity for an
independent,expert evaluation of their child at public expense.
Pet. Br. at 31; see also U.S. Br. at 11 n.3. Tobe sure, Schaffer
underscoresthe centrality of expert assistance, noting that it
wouldbe unfair to force parentsto do battle with schooldistricts
"without an expert with the firepowerto matchthe opposition."
126S. Ct. at 536. But petitioner andthe UnitedStates go too far
in suggesting that IDEArequires school districts to supply

x5 Manydistrict judges share this perspective. See, e.g., Brillon v.
Klein Ind. Sch. Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d 864, 872 (S.D. Tex. 2003), rev’d on
other grounds, 100 Fed. Appx.309 (5th Cir. 2004); Gross v. Perrysburg
ExemptedVill. Sch. Dist., 306 F. Supp. 2d 726, 739 (N.D. Ohio 2004);
Pazik v. GatewayReg’l Sch. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (D. Mass.
2001); P.G.v. Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251,267 (D.N.J.

2000).
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expertsto parents at public expense.
First, independentevaluationsand the retention of an expert
are different things. Evaluatorsdo not act as expertsfor parents;
they are "independent."Parents do not havefree rein in selecting
evaluators;the schooldistrict generallyfurnishesthe parentswith
a short list fromwhichthey maychoose.34 C.F.R.300.502(a)(2)
(2005). It is not the independentevaluator’s job to help parents
understandthe school’s technical evidence, framequestions to
challenge the school’s experts, or performthe other tasks one
expects of a party-retained expert. Noris there any expectation
that the evaluatorwill testify on the parents’ behalf at the due
process hearing, let alone a requirementthat such testimony
wouldcomeat public expense.
Moreover, neither IDEAnor the regulations guarantee
parents an independent evaluation at public expense. IDEA
accordsparents only the "opportunity,"not the right, to "obtain
an independenteducational evaluation of the child." 20 U.S.C.
1415(b)(1) (emphasis added). Althoughthe regulations
parents a conditionalright to a publicly-fundedevaluationif they
disagree with the school’s evaluation, the regulations also give
schools the option to deny parents’ request whenthe school
believes that existing evaluations are adequate. 34 C.F.R.
300.502(b)(2)(ii)(2005).Denialsforce parentsinto full-scale
process hearings on whether, under the circumstances, an
independentevaluation is in fact necessary. Id. The volumeof
litigation over schoolrefusals to payfor independentevaluations
16
suggests that denials are common.

16 See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493,1500(9th
Cir. 1996) (school board’s refusal to pay for an independent evaluation
improper); MurphysboroBd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d
(continued...)
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Thus, the possibility that parents will obtain a publiclyfunded independentevaluation in no wayrectifies the expert
imbalance Congresshas recognized. Rather, the imbalance is
addressed in Section 1415(i)(3)(B), which gives parents
assurance that the expert costs they incur in IDEAproceedings
will be reimbursedif they prevail.
C. Neither Petitioner Nor the United States Offers a
CoherentReadingof Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
The interpretations of Section 1415(i)(3)(B) put forth
petitioner and the United States are irreconcilable with the
provision’s text. They contend that Section 1415(i)(3)(B)
authorizes the "reimbursement
of only attorneys’ fees," and that,
to the extent that "costs"are availableto prevailingparents, those
costs are independently authorized under Sections 1821 and
1920, not IDEA.Pet. Br. at 18 (emphasisadded); see also U.S.
Br. at 10--12.That constructionis not faithful to the languageof
Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
1. To start, by contending that Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s
reference to "costs" is limited by the phrase "attorneys’ fees,"
petitioner and the UnitedStates reverse the provision’s actual
language, whichauthorizes an awardof attorneys’ fees "as part
of the costs to the parents." Thephrase"p .art of the costs" is not
a phrase of restriction that limits the provision to expenses
lawyers charge in litigating cases. It is instead a phrase of

(...continued)
1162, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Hudsonv. Wilson, 828 F.2d 1059,
1065 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); RaymondS. v. Ramirez, 918 F. Supp. 1280,
1290-91 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Seals v. Lofiis, 614 F. Supp. 302,
305-06 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (same); cf Ms. M. ex rel. K.M. v. Portland
Sch. Comm.,360 F. 3d 267, 271 (lst Cir. 2004) (school district did
appeal ruling that it should havepaid for an independentevaluation).

26
inclusion that covers "the costs to the parents," of which
attorneys’fees are but one part.
Evenworse, their construction takes an eraser to Section
1415(i)(3)(B). Theycontend that this Court should rewrite
Section1415(i)(3)(B) to saythat "the court, in its discretion,
awardreasonableattorneys’ fees to the parents of a child with a
disability whois the prevailing party." That rewriting deletes
entirely the phrase "as part of the costs" from Section
1415(i)(3)(B). It not only renders the phrase surplusage, see
AlaskaDep’t of Envtl. Conservationv. EPA,540 U.S. 461,489
n.13 (2004); Duncanv. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), but
deleting five wordsfroma provision that has only thirty-eight
words is hardly a trivial modification. As this Court has
admonished,"parties should not seek to amend[a] statute by
appeal to the Judicial Branch." Barnhartv. SigmonCoal Co.,
534 U.S. 438,462 (2002).
Finally, petitioner and the UnitedStates rest their argument
almostexclusivelyon the fact that there are similarities between
the language in Section 1415(i)(3)(B) and Section 1988.
there are significant differences as well, whichthey overlook.
Casey rejected the argument that expert fees are part of
"attorneys’ fees" to parties in Section 1988 district court
litigation. That is not the Murphys’
argument.Theclaimhere is
that the costs of experts are recoverable, not as part of an
attorney’s fees (indeed, the Murphysproceeded pro se), but
becauseexpert costs are "part of the costs to parents" in IDEA
administrative proceedings. As we explain in Part III, these
textual differencesunderscorethat roughsimilarities in language
do not justify readingstatutes with different text and different
aimsas if they werethe same.
2. To bolster its interpretation, petitioner argues that the

27
explicit inclusionof attorneys’fees reflects Congress’deliberate
exclusionof expert costs. Pet. Br. at 18. This contentionis also
refuted by the text of Section 1415(i)(3)(B). Thephrase "aspart
of the costs to the parents" makesplain that attorneys’ fees are
not the exclusive "costs" authorized under the Act; to the
contrary, it drives homethat additional costs are authorizedas
well: Petitioner’s argument is indistinguishable from the
contentionthis Court rejected in Barnhartv. PeabodyCoal: "We
do not read the enumerationof one case to excludeanotherunless
it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed
possibility and meantto say no to it." 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)
(citing UnitedDominionIndus., Inc. v. UnitedStates, 532 U.S.
822, 836 (2001)).
3. Both petitioner and the UnitedStates claim that Section
1415(i)(3)(F) supports their reading of Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
Section 1415(i)(3)(F) permits a court to reduce attorneys’
awards when parents or lawyers unreasonably protract the
controversy, or whenlawyers charge unjustifiably high fees.
Theycontendthat, had Congressintended to authorize recovery
of expert costs, "Congresswould[not] have gone to such great
lengths in Section1415(i)(3)(F)to identify the circumstances
whichan award of attorneys’ fees should be reduced but have
remainedsilent as to expertfees." Pet. Br. at 18 n.6; see also U.S.
Br. at 11.
Congress had good reason to treat lawyers and experts
differently in this regard. Section 1415(i)(3)(F) signals
courts shouldscrutinize attorneys’ fee applications closely to
guard against abusivelegal tactics and inflated attorneys’ fees.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 6 (1986). Lawyersand parents
have considerable powerto engage in delay-inducing tactics.
Experts do not. Experts do not decide what services they will
provide or whether they will testify; lawyers or parents make
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those determinations. Moreover,Section 1415(i)(3)(B) confers
amplepoweron the courts to control expert costs, as this case
demonstrates. Thedistrict court reduced a request for expert
costs exceeding$29,000,whichit thoughtwasa fair valuationof
the services provided,to less than $9,000to conformwith Section
1415(i)(3)(B)’s mandate.Thus, Section1415(i)(3)(F)’s
on abusivelitigation tactics by parentsand their lawyersis in no
¯ way inconsistent with Congress’ decision in Section
1415(i)(3)(B)to authorizeawardsof expert
4. Theevidencecontradicts the unsupportedclaims madeby
petitioner and the UnitedStates that Section1415(i)(3)(B)
be construed narrowly to avoid imposing a fiscal burden on
school districts. Pet. Br. at 30-34; U.S. Br. at 23. Awardsof
expert costs are generally modest.Manyreported cases do not
specifythe amount
of expert costs, but in those that do, the costs
17
range from a few hundreddollars to a few thousanddollars.

iv See, e.g., S. v. TimberlaneReg’l Sch. Dist., 2004U.S. Dist. Lexis
4032, at *25 (D.N.H. 2004) ($825); Noyes v. GrossmontUnion High Sch.
Dist., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251 (S.D. Cal. 2004) ($328.33); McC.v.
Corrigan-CamdenInd. Sch. Dist., 909 F. Supp~1023, 1033 (E.D. Tex.
1995) ($500); Turton v. Crisp CountySch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 1535, 1540
(M.D.Ga. 1988) ($415.62); see also R.E. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 2003
U.S. Dist. Lexis 58, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ($ 2,119.5]); J. v. Bd. of
Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 242-243 (D. Conn. 2000) ($2,622); P.G.v.
Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.N.J. 2000)
($1,207.50); B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F. Supp: 2d 777, 784 (D.
Conn. 1999) ($3,450); Poynorv. Cmty. Seh. Dist., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis
1883, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ($7,600); Field v. HaddonfieldBd. of Educ.,
769 F. Supp. 1313, 1323-24, 1329 (D.N.J. 1991) ($1,801); Hirsch v.
McKenzie, 1988 WL78859, at *3 (D.D.C. 1988) ($200). There appear
be only three reported cases in which expert awards exceed $10,000. See
Bd. ofEduc, v. Summers, 358 F. Supp. 2d 462, 472-473 (D. Md. 2005)
($13,974); B.D.v. DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201, 208-09 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) ($104,784in settlement of complex,multi-party proceeding); K.Y.
(continued...)

29
Awardsin excess of $10,000are rare. Shifting expert costs is
crucial to parents like the Murphys,for whoma few thousand
dollars is a fortune, and could well be decisive to parents in
determiningwhetherto run the financial risk of hiring an expert.
But there is no evidencethat permittingparents to recoverexpert
costs imposesa fiscal burdenon schooldistricts.
II. TheHistory Of Section 1415(i)(3)(B) Demonstrates
That It Authorizes The PaymentOf Expert Costs.
WhenCongressenacted the HCPA,
it understoodthat Section
1415(i)(3)(B) authorized parents to recover not just
attorney’s fees, but the full costs incurred in the due process
hearing, including expert costs. That understandingis reflected
in the text of Section 1415(i)(3)(B), as well as the
provisionrequiring the GAO
study and report. It is also reflected
in both the implementationhistory of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)
the drafting history of the HCPA,each of which demonstrates
that, at the time Section1415(i)(3)(B)wasenacted, there
doubtthat it authorizedthe recoveryof expert costs.
A. The Dnplementation History of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)
Confirmsthe Availability of ExpertCosts.
Conspicuouslyomitted fromthe briefs of petitioner and the

(...continued)
v. Me. Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 207, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2123, at "13
(N.D. Ill. 1999) ($11,190). The modest amountsawardedin expert costs
drive homethat petitioner’s cost-based objections are especially hollow.
Had the Murphyshad counsel in this matter, which spanned five years,
involved multiple administrative proceedings, and resulted in two
published SecondCircuit opinions, seven district court opinions, and one
ruling by a state court, the attorneys’ fees wouldhave dwarfedthe modest
costs awardedby the district court.

30
UnitedStates is any accountof Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’sinitial
implementation.The most reliable sources for interpreting a
statute are contemporaneous
ones--whenrecollections are fresh
and source materials easy to find-- not those nearly twentyyears
removed.See AmocoProd. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S.
865, 873-74 (1999); MCITelecomrns., 512 U.S. at 228.
Nonetheless,petitioner andthe UnitedStates ignoreall of the pre2002sources because, until 2002, the issue had been resolved
oyerwhelmingly
in the parents’ favor.
To start with, the GAOReport submitted to Congressjust
three years after the HCPA’spassage made explicit that
consultant costs, expert witnessfees, and the costs of tests or
evaluationsnecessaryto the parents’ case are reimbursableunder
the Act. GAO
Reportat 13. This contemporaneous
interpretation
of the Act should be accorded deference. Cf Norwegian
NitrogenProds. Co. v. UnitedStates, 288U.S. 294, 315(1933).
Theinitial judicial constructionsof the Act also uniformly
favoredcoverageof expertcosts. Duringthe first five years after
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) wasenacted, every court to consider the
question concludedthat IDEAauthorizes the reimbursementof
expert fees. Foremost amongthese decisions was the Third
Circuit’s 1988 ruling in Arons, 842 F.2d at 63. At least six
district courts in four different circuits reached the same
~8
conclusion.
This Court’s 1991decision in Caseyhad little impacton the

18 See Field, 769 F. Supp. at 1323-24;Kattanv. District of Columbia,
1991U.S. Dist. Lexis 14543, at "9-10 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d, 995 F.2d 274
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Doe v. WatertownSch. Comm.,701 F. Supp. 264, 266
(D. Mass. 1988); Changv. Bd. of Educ., 685 F. Supp. 96, 100 (D.N.J.
1988); Turton, 688 F. Supp. at 1540; Hirsch, 1988WL78859, at *3.
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waylower courts viewed Section 1415(i)(3)(B). During
decadefollowing Casey (1991-2001), no court of appeals and
onlya handful
of district courts(actingin responseto Casey)held
that expertcosts werenot recoverableunderthe statute.19 Onthe
other hand, duringthe sametime-frame,twenty-ninedistrict
2° Thus,
judges found expert costs compensableunder IDEA.

~9 Prior to 2002, only four cases squarely held that Section
1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize reimbursementof expert Brandon
K. v. NewLenox Sch. Dist., 2001U.S. Dist. Lexis 20006, at "9-12 (N.D.
Ill. 2001); Eirschele v. Craven CountyBd. ofEduc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 655,
659 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Cynthia K. v. Bd. of Educ., 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis
4054, at *6 (N.D. II1. 1996); Jennings v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 1992
U.S. Dist. Lexis 20575, at "41-42 (M.D.Fla. 1992). Onecourt said so
dicta, Mayov. Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md.1999), but other
courts in the same district have rejected Mayo. See Summers, 358 F.
Supp. 2d at 472-73 (and case cited therein). In Shanahanv. Bd. ofEduc.,
953 F. Supp. 440, 446 n.9 (N.D.N.Y.1997), the court denied expert costs
¯ on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to submit any "authority for
awardinga prevailing party expert fees" under IDEA,even though, at the
time, there was contrary case law. See, e.g., Straube v. Fla. UnionFree
Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1182n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
20 First Circuit: Pazik v. GatewayReg’l Sch. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d
217, 221-22 (D. Mass. 2001); Gonzalez v. P.R. Dept. ofEduc., 1 F. Supp.
2d 111, 116-17 (D.P.R. 1998); Arunimv. FoxboroughPub. Sch., 970 F.
Supp. 51, 55 (D. Mass. 1997); P.S.v. ContoocookValley Sch. Dist., No.
95-154-M, 24 IDELR¶ 1141 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 1996); Fennemanv. Town
of Gorham, 802 F. Supp. 542, 544, 548-49 (D. Me. 1992). Second
Circuit: B.D.v. DeBuono,177 F. Supp. 2d 201,208-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 242-43 (D. Conn. 2000); P.L.v.
Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 64 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D. Corm. 1999); B.
Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784 (D. Conn. 1999); Connors
v. Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 808 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); C.G.v. NewHaven
Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 60, 68 (D. Conn. 1997); Straube, 801 F. Supp.
at 1182. Third Circuit: P.G.v. Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d
251,267 (D.N.J. 2000); Woodsidev. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 2000 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 568, at "16-17 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Boroughof PalmyraBd. of Educ.
(continued...)
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from1986until 2001-- ten years after Caseyandfifteen years
after Section 1415(i)(3)(B) was addedto IDEA-the
Circuit andthirty-five district judgesconcludedthat the Act
authorized
awards
of expertcosts, whileonlya handfulof district
judgessawthe matterotherwise.
Eventhe UnitedStates recognizedthat expert costs are
coveredby Section1415(i)(3)(B). In a FederalRegister
publishedafter the 1997 IDEAamendments,
the Department
of
Educationmodifiedits attorneys’ fees regulation, 34 C.F.R.
300.513,"to makeit clear that the prohibitionagainstusingPart
B fundsfor attorney’sfees also appliesto the relatedcosts of a
party in an action or proceeding,such as depositions, expert
witnesses, settlements, and other related costs." 64 Fed.
Reg.12,406,12,615(Mar.12, 1999) (emphasisadded);see also
65 Fed. Reg. 53,808, 53,812(Sept. 5, 2000).

(...continued)
v. R.C.,No. 97-6199, 31 IDELR¶ 3 (D.N.J. July 29, 1999); B.K.v. Toms
River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462, 474 (D,N.J. 1998); S.D.v. Manville
Bd. of Educ., 989 F. Supp. 649, 657 (D.N.J. 1998); E.M.v. Millville Bd.
of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312, 317-318 (D.N.J. 1994). Fifth Circuit: McC.
v. Corrigan-Camden
Ind. Sch. Dist., 909 F. Supp. 1023, 1033 (E.D. Tex.
1995). Seventh Circuit: Koswendav. FlossmoorSch. Dist. No. 161,227
F. Supp. 2d 979, 996-98(N.D. Ill. 2002); Poynorv. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist.
No. 300, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18831, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1999); K.Y.v. Me.
Twp., 1999 U.S. Dist Lexis 2123, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Dale M. v. Bd.
of Educ., 29 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (C.D. Ill. 1998), rev’d on other
grounds, 237 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2001); Hungerv. Leininger, 1993 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 3080, at *24(N.D. Ill. 1993). Eighth Circuit: Ind. Sch. Dist.
No. 283 v. S.D., 948 F. Supp. 892, 897 n.4 (D. Minn. 1996). Ninth
Circuit: Ash v. Lake OswegoSch. Dist. No. 7J, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis
5235, at *2-3 (D. Or. 1992), aff’d, 980 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1992). D.C.
Circuit: Callowayv. District of Columbia,1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13751
(D.D.C. 1999); Bailey v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 888, 892
(D.D.C. 1993); Aranowv. District of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 318, 318
(D.D.C. 1992).
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Petitioner and the United States presumablybegin their
accountin 2002to coincidewith the EighthCircuit’s two-to-one
decisionin NeoshoR- V SchoolDistrict v. Clark, 315F. 3d 1022,
that Case)/precludes expert costs under IDEA.Following
Neosho,the SeventhCircuit in T.D. v. LaGrange
SchoolDistrict,
349 F.3d 469 (2003), a divided D.C. Circuit in Goldring v.
District of Columbia,416F.3d 70 (2005), and one district court,
HiramC. v. MantecaUnified School District, 2004 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 29177, at "9-10 (E.D. Cal. 2004), joined the no-expertcosts camp.However,a majority of courts, including the Second
Circuit in Murphyand nine district courts in the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, have rejected the
reasoningin Neosho21
and held that expert costs are available.
Thepointhere is not that the majorityrules. Rather,it is that
these decisions belie petitioner and the UnitedStates’ central
claim that Section 1415(i)(3)(B) "unambiguously"
excludes
award of expert costs. In Casey, the Court closely examined
opinionsin Civil RightsAct cases "at the time the provision was
enacted" and found that they cut against the conclusion that
Congressintended that expert costs be recoverableunderSection
1988. See Casey, 494 U.S. at 94-97 (reviewingcases). Here, the

21 Murphyv. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332,
336 (2d Cir. 2005); Czarniewyv. District of Columbia, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS5161, at "15-16 (D.D.C. 2005); Summers, 358 F. Supp. 2d at
472-473; Gross v. Perrysburg ExemptedVill. Sch. Dist., 306 F. Supp. 2d
726, 738-739 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Noyes v. Grossmont Union High Sch.
Dist., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251 (S.D. Cal. 2004); S. v. Timberlane
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4032, at *22-25 (D.N.H. 2004);
R.E.v.N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 58, at *8-9
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); E.R.v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis
26722(D.N.J. 2003); Brillon v. Klein Ind. Sch. Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d
864, 870-872 (S.D. Tex. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 100 Fed. Appx.
309 (5th Cir. 2004); see also LamoineSch. Comm.v. Ms. Z, 353 F. Supp.
2d 18, 44(D. Me. 2005) (awarding fees to educational consultant).
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evidence of contemporary judicial understanding cuts in the
opposite direction and is unequivocal; it confirms the Murphys’
reading of Section 1415(i)(3)(B). It is implausible to contend,
do petitioner and the UnitedStates, that all of these decisions, the
GAO, and indeed, the Department of Education, are wrong
because the statute "unambiguously"forbids the conclusion they
reached.
B. The Drafiing History of HCPAConfirms Congress ’Intent
that Prevailing Parents are Entitled to Recover Expert Costs.
The drafting
history of the HCPAreinforces
the
straightforward, textual reading of Section 1415(i)(3)(B) set
above. See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women,126 S. Ct. 1264
(2006); ExxonMobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611,
2625-27 (2005). It demonstrates that at every stage of Congress’
deliberations there was a bipartisan consensus in both Housesto
authorize prevailing parents to recover their expert costs.
1. Congress enacted the HCPAto respond to Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), which held that, in light of the
comprehensiveness of IDEA’s remedial scheme, it provided an
exclusive remedyand, for that reason, parents could not recover
attorneys’ fees by joining claims under the Civil Rights or
Rehabilitation Acts. Justice Brennan’sdissent, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, urged Congressto revisit the issue. Id. at
i030-31.2z

22 Onlyrecoveryof "attorneys’fees" underthe Civil RightsActand
Section504of the RehabilitationActwereat issue in Smith. It did not
address whether IDEA’sprovision for equitable relief, 20 U.S.C.
1415(i)(3)(C)(iii),authorizedthe reimbursement
of expensesparents
in IDEAproceedings.But this provisionis relevant as well, becauseit
reflects Congress’understandingthat IDEAempowered
courts to make
(continued...)
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Congressdid just that. Nineteendays later, identical bills
were introducedin both the Houseand Senate to overturn Smith.
Thebills provided,amongother things, that "[i]n any action or
proceeding brought under this subsection, the court, in its
discretion, mayawarda reasonableattorney’s fee as part of the
costs to a parent or legal representativeof a handicapped
child or
youthwhois the prevailingparty." See, e.g., S. 2895,98th Cong.
2 (1984). Nohearing was held in either Houseduring 1984.
OnFebruary 6, 1985, Senator Lowell Weickerintroduced a
bill, identical to that introduced in 1984, before the 99th
Congress. See HandicappedChildren’s Protection Act of 1985,
S. 415, 99th Cong. (1985). OnMarch7, Representative Pat
Williamsintroduceda modifiedversion of the original bill in the
Housedesignedto address concernsthat wereraised the previous
year. See Hearingon H.R. 1523 Before the Subcomm.on Select
Educationof the H. Comm.on Education and Labor, 99th Cong.
2-3 (1985) (House Hearings). Hearings were then held, and
manywitnesses emphasizedthat the fair resolution of IDEA

(...continued)
prevailing parents whole. As noted above, in Burlington, this Court
unanimouslyinterpreted IDEA’sequitable provision broadly, to require
school boards to reimburse parents for their expenditures on unilateral
placements ultimately found warranted. IDEA’sequitable provision was
enacted in the fall of 1975, just a few monthsafter this Court’s decision in
Alyeska Pipeline Services Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
had disapproved the use of non-statutory equitable factors to reimburse
attorneys’ fees, but before Congresshad reacted to Alyeska by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1976. Nothingin Alyeska -- or Smith -- spoke to
the question of reimbursingexpensesfor expert assistance, a practice that
had been approved by this Court as an element of equitable relief as
recently as Bradley v. City of RichmondSchool Board, 416 U.S. 696, 723
(1974). It did not becomeclear until this Court’s decisions in Crawford
and Caseythat expert costs weresimilarly affected.
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cases dependson parentshavingexpertassistance.23 Nowitness
disagreed.Nordid anyonesuggestthat prevailingparentsshould
24
not be reimbursed
for expertcosts.
Following
the hearings,a substituteversionof the Senatebill
wasproposedthat providedthat a court mayaward"a
reasonable
attorney’s fee, reasonablewitness fees, andother reasonable
expensesof the civil action, in additionto the costs"to a parent
whois the prevailingparty. See S. Rep.No. 99-112,at 7 (1985)
(SenateReport); see also id. at 4-11. Butthe substitute also
includeda provisioncappingthe fees that couldbe awarded
legal
services lawyers, which was opposedby Houseand Senate

23 See, e.g., HouseHearings,at 42 (testimony of Beverly J. Galarza);
id. at 44 (testimony of HenryW.Christopher); see also Hearingon S. 415
Before the Subcomm.on the Handicappedof the S. Comm.on Labor and
Human Resources, 99th Cong. 10-11 (1985) (Senate Hearings)
(testimony of EdwardAbrahamson); id. at 35 (testimony of EdwinW.
Martin); id. at 92-93 (statement of the Florida Governor’s Commission
on Advocacyfor Persons with Disabilities); id. at 113-14 (additional
commentof E. Richard Larson).
24 The National School Board Association (NSBA)testified and
submitted a prepared statement during the House hearings and submitted
extensive commentsfor the record of the Senate Hearing. NSBAmade
knownits concerns about the fiscal impact the amendmentsmight have
and about the availability of attorneys’ fees for due process hearings,
which, in NSBA’sview, might make them more adversarial. At no point,
however, did the NSBAexpress concern about permitting prevailing
parents to recover expert fees. See HouseHearings, at 23-28; Senate
Hearings, at 61-79. This was not an oversight. NSBA’s Senate
submissionexpressed concern about authorizing recovery of "the costs of
experts during the I.E.P. conference,"whichis non-adversarial, id. at 70,
but raised no objection to shifting the costs of experts used during
adversarial due process hearings.
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Democrats,as well as other controversial provisions./d.25 These
provisions-- not expert costs -- prompteda bipartisan groupof
senators, led by Senators Hatch, Weicker, and Dole, but also
including Senators Kerry, Kennedy,and Metzenbaum,
to propose
a streamlinedsubstitute bill, referred to as the Hatch-Weicker
substitute.
Id. at 15-16. Hatch-Weicker provided for
discretionary awardsof"a reasonableattorney’s fee in addition
to the costs to a parent" of a child with a disability. 131Cong.
Rec. 21389.
Hatch-Weicker (AmendmentNo. 561) was accepted
motionby Senator Dole at the outset of the Senate debate. Id.
Senator Weicker explained that Hatch-Weicker had been
"developedin conjunction with and agreed to by the Department
of Education and the Department of Justice." Id. He
characterizedthe cost and fee provision as consistent with "more
[than] 130fee shifting statutes" alreadyenacted,id. at 21390,and
then describedit as follows:
S. 415 will enable courts to compensate
parents for whateverreasonable costs they
had to incur to fully secure what was
guaranteedto themby the EHA.As in other
fee shiftingstatutes, it is our intent that such
awardswill include, at the discretion of the
court, reasonableattorney’s fees, necessary
expert witness fees, and other reasonable
expenses whichwere necessary for parents
to vindicatetheir claimto a free appropriate
public educationfor their handicapped
child.

2s See, e.g., Senate Report,at 17-18(additional viewsof SenatorsKerry,
Kennedy,Pell, Dodd, Simon, Metzenbaum
and Matsunaga); 132 Cong. Rec.
17608(1986) (Rep. Williams).
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Id. NoSenatorquestionedthis statement, althoughdisputes over
other matters were aired. TheSenate adoptedS. 415 without a
recordedvote. Id. at 21393.
Proceedings in the Housereflect the samecommitmentto
makingexpert costs available to prevailing parents. Following
the Househearings, a substitute version of H.R. 1523 was
reported out of committeethat authorized courts to "award
reasonable attorneys’ fees, expensesand costs" to prevailing
parents. H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 1, 5 (1985) (HouseReport).
The HouseReport explained that "the phrase ’expenses and
costs’ includesexpensesof expert witnesses;the reasonablecosts
of any study, report, test, or project whichis found to be
necessaryfor the preparation of the parents’ or guardian’sdue
process hearing, state administrativereviewor civil action; as
well as traditional costs and expensesincurred in the course of
litigating a case(e.g., depositionsandinterrogatories)."Id. at 6.
There wasno objection to this provision, although, like the
Senatebill, the HouseBill did contain controversialprovisions,
including one authorizing the recovery of attorneys’ fees and
costs for administrative proceedings, even in the absence of
litigation. See id. at 15-17(supplementalviews).
Bythe time the bill reachedthe floor, there wasbipartisan
agreementon a newsub stitute bill. 131Cong.Rec. 31369( 1985)
(remarks of Rep. Williams). The newbill did not change the
cost-shifting provision. Butto accommodate
concernsabout the
bill’s cost, it did add a provisiondirecting the GAO
to studyand
report to Congresson the legislation’s fiscal impact,accompanied
by a "sunset" provision. Id. at 31370. Withthe compromise
in
place, the Housepassed H.R.1523without a recorded vote. Id.
at 31377. Atnopoint during the House’sdeliberations on H.R.
1523wasany objection raised to allowingprevailing parents to
recoupexpert costs.
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After the Housevote, conferees met to iron out differences
betweenthe two bills. The conferees largely accepted S. 415
insofar as it definedparents’rights to recoverattorneys’fees and
costs, and they acceptedH.R.1523insofar as it directed the GAO
to study the fiscal impactof the legislation and report backto
Congress,but without a sunset provision. See H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 99-687, at 1-3 (1986) (Conference Report). The Joint
Statement identified the various issues the Conferees had
resolved. Reiterating what the Houseand Senate had already
beentold about the provision, the Confereesexplainedthat "the
term’attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ include[s] reasonable
expensesand fees of expert witnessesand the reasonablecosts of
any test or evaluation whichis found to be necessary for the
preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the action or
proceeding,as well as traditional costs incurredin the course of
litigating a case." Id. at 5. 26 The ConferenceReport and the
accompanying
Joint Statement were printed together (amounting
to seven pagesof text) and circulated to all members
of Congress
in advanceof the vote on the final bill; they werealso reprinted
27
in the CongressionalRecord. 132 Cong.Rec. 16701(1986).

z6 The Conferees did makeone notable change to the wordingof what
becameSection 1415(i)(3)(B). It substituted the phrase "attorneys’ as
part of the costs" for "attorney’s fees in addition to the costs." TheJoint
Statement explains that "[t]his change incorporates the SupremeCourt
Marekv. Chesny[, 473 U.S. 1 (1985)] decision." ConferenceReport, at 5.
Marekheld that where the underlying statute defines "costs" to include
attorneys’ fees, attorneys’ fees are included in offers of settlement under
Rule 68. Although the Conferees’ modification of the language had
implications for Rule68 settlement offers, it had no bearing on the meaning
of"costs." Id.; see also Marek, 473 U.S. at 11-12.
27 Congressdoes this for a reason. The Joint Statementsets forth the
understanding of the Membersof Congress who drafted the final bill,
which reflects compromiseson issues dividing the two houses. The Joint
(continued...)
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Boththe SenateandHouseacceptedthe ConferenceReport.
132 Cong.Rec. 16823-25(1986); id. at 17607-12.At no point
wasanyobjectionraised to the Conferees’statementthat expert
costs wouldbe subjectto reimbursement
underthe Act. TheAct
wassigned into law by PresidentReaganon August5, 1986.
2. Despitethis clear intent, petitioner claimsthat "noone
suggestedthat the languageCongressenacted--’attorneys’fees
as part of the costs’ -- encompassed
expertfees." Pet. Br. at 24
n. 10. Thatassertionis incorrect:the Joint Statement,
signedby
the HouseandSenateConferees,said just that.
Equallyunavailingis petitioner’sclaimthat the legislative
history proves"that Congresspurposefullydeclinedto include
expertcosts in attorneys’fees." Id. Petitionerpointsout thatthe
Senatebill initially authorizedthe awardof "witnessfees," but
the final bill omittedthat term.Thatis true, butdoesnottell the
wholestory. As shownabove, the "witnessfee" languagewas
(...continued)
Statement informs Membersof Congress of the final bill’s contents and
howit differs from the bills approvedin the Houseand Senate. After the
Conferees issue the Report, it then goes back to both chambers,whereit
is distributed to Membersbefore they vote on whether to accept the
Conference Report. Only if both chambers approve the Conference
Report is the legislation submitted to the President. The Joint Statement
is thus a document of considerable authority. See Hon. Robert A.
Katzmann, Courts and Congress 63~54 (1997) (quoting Judge James
Buckley as remarking that, as a Senator, "myunderstanding of most of
the legislation I voted on was based entirely on myreading of its
language and, where necessary, on explanations contained in the
accompanyingreport"); see also City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &
WreckerServ., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002) (citing ConferenceReport
to construe statute); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317 (2001) (same);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 74 (1981) ("The [Conference] Report,
therefore, is considerablymoresignificant than a typical report of a single
House,and its findings are in effect findings of the entire Congress.").
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part of a controversialbill that wasscrapped,in part, becauseit
cappedfees for legal services lawyers. It wasreplaced by the
Hatch-Weickersubstitute. As Senator Weickerexplained when
he introducedHatch-Weicker,
the substitute’s languagewasto be
construed to cover "attorney’s fees, necessary expert witness
fees, and other reasonable expenses"necessaryfor the parents’
28
case. 131 Cong.Rec. at 21389-90(1985).
Nordoes the omissionof the word"expenses"from the final
legislation demonstratean intent to exclude expert costs, as
petitioner contends. The Housereceded to the Senate’s bill in
Conference,but did so basedon the Joint Statement’sexplanation
that expenses and expert costs are covered by Section
1415(i)(3)(B). See ConferenceReport, at 5. Andfundamentally,
recoveryof"expenses"is part of the Act; the GAO
wastasked to
report on "expenses" recovered by prevailing parents to
Congress.Contrary to petitioner’s claim, these minortextual
changesdo not demonstratethat Congress"purposefully declined
to include expert costs" in the Act.
Finally, petitioner and the United States contend that the
focusof the legislative effort wasto restore to parentsthe right to
recoverattorneys’fees, not expertcosts. Pet. Br. at 24 n. 10; U.S.
Br. at 19 n.7. Thatassertion is partially true. It is correct that
"attorneys’ fees’; werethe sole item at issue in Smith. But to
suggest that Congressin the HCPA
single-mindedly focused on
attorneys’ fees is to dramatically understate what Congress
sought to achieve in the HCPA,whichreflects Congress’full28 Senator Weicker’sreference to 130 similar statutes showsthat he
was unawareof the variations amongthese statutes that this Court later
relied on in Casey. That is not surprising. As noted above, nothing in the
record of Congress’ deliberations on the HCPAsuggests that Senator
Weickeror his colleagues had any expectation that the variations in drafting
cost-shifting provisions had the significance later given to themin Casey.
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bore disapproval29
of Smith.
Petitioner and the United States fixate on what the HCPA
purportedly did not do. But what is striking about their
discussionof the history of the HCPA
is howlittle they say about
what Congressdid do in the Act. In the course of shaping the
HCPA,Congressresolved manycontentious issues. But there
wasnot one objectionto authorizingprevailingparents to recover
expert costs. Norwasthere any reason, giventhe then-prevailing
understanding about the meaning of the word "costs," to
conclude that Congresshad anything else in mind. All of the
indicia of congressionalintent -- the full text of the HCPA,
its
purposeand the purposeof IDEA,and the resolve of the leaders
of both parties to support the Hatch-Weickersubstitute -support the conclusionthat Congressauthorizedthe recoveryof
expertcosts.
III. CrawfordFitting AndCasey DoNot Call For A
Different ReadingOf The Act.
Every case holding that IDEAdoes not permit awards of
expert costs has relied on Caseyto concludethat "costs" has a
legal, term-of-art meaningthat excludes expert fees. This
reliance is misplaced.Neither CrawfordFittingnor Caseysheds
light on whatCongressmeantin 1986whenit enacted the HCPA.

29 Congressaccomplishedmanygoals in the HCPA:Section 2, codified
at 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B), provided the authorization for the award
"attorneys’ fees" found lacking in Smith; Section 3, codified at 1415(/),
overturned Smith’s basic holding by providing that claims under the Civil
Rights and Rehabilitation Acts maybe maintained with IDEAclaims;
Section 4 directed the GAOReport; and Section 5 made Section
1415(i)(3)(B)retroactive to all cases broughtor pendingafter July 4,
(the day before Smith was decided).
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To understand whythese decisions do not inform the
interpretation of IDEA,it is useful to review their specific
holdings. In CrawfordFitting, the Court held that the expenses
of hiring an expertcouldnot be assessedagainst a losing party as
part of "costs" in federal court proceedings governedby 28
U.S.C.1821and t 920. "[A]bsentexplicit statutory or contractual
authorization for the taxation of the expensesof a litigant’s
witnessesas costs, federal courts are boundby the limitations set
out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821and § 1920," whichdo not authorize the
shifting of expert costs. 482 U.S. at 445. Buildingon Crawford
Fitting, Caseyheld that Section 1988’sauthorization for awards
of "attorneys’ fees" did not extend to expert fees. 499 U.S. at
96-97. TheCourtsupportedits conclusionby first pointingto 28
U.S.C. 1821(b) and 1920(c) -- which fix compensation
witnesses (not just experts) in federal court proceedings-- and
held that there wasno indication that Congressrepealed these
provisions by implication whenit enacted Section 1988. Id. at
87-88. Caseyalso observedthat Congress,in thirty-four other
cost-shifting statutes, explicitly provided authorization to
reimburseexpert witnesses. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it wasfair to concludethat Congresshad not intended
Section 1988’s authorization to award attorneys’ fees as
encompassing
expert fees. Id. at 3°
88-94.
30 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly authorized awards of
expert fees in Section 1988. P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991),
codified at 42 U.S.C. 1988(c). Congress did not revisit IDEAin that
enactment. At that time, there was no need to: Nocourt had ruled, or
even suggested, that IDEAdid not provide authorization for expert costs.
Nor did Congress revisit the issue when IDEAwas reauthorized in 1997
or 2004. Both petitioner and the United States point to proposed
legislation in 2004 that would have amended IDEAand many other
statutes to provide explicit authorization for expert fees awards.Pet. Br.
at 22 n.8; U.S. Br. at 22-23 n.8. But as this Court emphasizedearlier
this Term,"[f]ailed legislative proposals are a ’particularly dangerous
(continued...)
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In Casey, the Court distinguished IDEAfrom Section 1988
by pointingto the Joint Statement’sexplanationthat expert costs
wouldbe reimbursable. TheCourt remarked:"The specification
[in the Joint Statement]wouldhavebeenquite unnecessaryif the
ordinary meaningof the term included those elements. The
statement is an apparenteffort to depart from ordinarymeaning
and to define a term of art." 499 U.S. at 91 n.5 (emphasisin
original). Courts have disputed the meaningof this footnote.
Compare,e.g., Murphy,Pet. App. at 10a-1 ! a, with Goldring,
416F.3dat 75. But one thing is clear: Caseyavoidedpre-judging
the issue in this case. Andfor goodreason. There are many
factors that differentiate this case fromCasey,beyondthe most
obviousone -- that IDEAis a very different statute than Section
1988, and the language of IDEAhas to be examinedin the
context of that statute. Leocal,543U.S. at 8-10.
1. First and foremost, the text of Section 1415(i)(3)(B),
coupledwith Congress’direction to the GAO
to study and report
back on the costs of expenses and consultants in IDEAcases,
leave no doubt that Section 1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes courts
reimburseexpert costs to prevailing parents. Statutory language
mustbe construedin light of the historical context facing the
Congressthat enactedit; not throughthe lens of hindsight,postenactment developments,or the language of other, unrelated
statutes. MCITelecomms., 512 U.S. at 228. Nothing in the
HCPA’s
history suggests that Congressanticipated the legal,
term-of-art meaningthat CrawfordFittingand Caseyascribed to
the word"costs," and there is muchto refute it. At every turn,

(..:continued)
groundon whichto rest an interpretation of a prior statute.’" Lockhartv.
United States, 126 S. Ct. 699, 702 (2005) (quoting United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) and Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633,650 (1990)).
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Congressexpressedits understandingthat courts wouldconstrue
the cost-shifting languagein the Actto authorizeawardsof expert
costs, not to preclude such awards. In so doing, Congressmade
it clear that "costs" shouldbe readin its ordinarysense, not as a
term of art. To the extent that Crawfordand Casey demand
clarity on Congress’part, that test is amplymethere.
2. Thetext and purposesof IDEAand Section 1988are quite
different, whichalso suggests that Caseyhas no bearing here.
Thereare key textual differences betweenthe twoprovisionsthat
reflect their different aims. Section1415(i)(3)(B)speaks
costs to the parents." Section 1988authorizes costs to "the
prevailing party." This difference reflects Congress’intent in
IDEAto authorize the reimbursementof costs parents incur
mainly in challenging adverse school board determinations in
state administrative proceedings,31 whereasSection 1988 was
aimedat permittingprevailing civil rights plaintiffs to recover
their litigation costs in federal court. Section 1988does not
ordinarily authorize awards of costs incurred in state
administrativeproceedings.See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Transp.v.
Crest St. Cmty.Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986); Webbv. Dyer
CountyBd.of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 (1985). Becausethe aims
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) are so different, petitioner’s
uncritically to engraft Casey’sunderstandingabout the meaning
of"attomeys’ fees" in Section 1988onto the authorization for
"the costs to the parents" in Section1415(i)(3)(B)is unavailing.
Roughsimilarities in statutory languagecannot be invokedas a
meansof subvertingstark differences in congressionalintent.
3~ Everycircuit recognizes that parents maybring an action underIDEA
solely to recover fees and costs incurred in state administrativeproceedings.
See, e.g., Eggers v. Bullitt CountySch. Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 895-898(6th
Cir.1988); Brownv. Griggsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. Four, 12 F.3d
681,683-85(7thCir. 1993); Moorev. District of Columbia,907 F.2d 165,
169-172(D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).

46
Moreover, Casey rested in part on the proposition
that
permitting expert fees to be awarded in litigation under Section
1988 as part of attorneys’ fees would work an implied repeal of
28 U.S.C. 1821(b) and 1920. Casey, 499 U.S. at 87-88. But
those provisions,
by their express terms, apply only to
proceedings in federal court. As noted, IDEA proceedings are
different from the civil rights cases covered by Section 1988,
because the record in IDEAcases is compiled during state due
process hearings where Sections 1821(b) and 1920 have
applicability. Thus, Casey’ s implied repeal theory has no bearing
32
on IDEA.

3. Caseyalso basedits rulingona determination
that, at the
time CongressenactedSection 1988, cost-shifting provisions
authorizingthe awardof"attomey’s
fees as partof the costs"had

32 The majority opinions in Goldring and Neoshosuggest that courts
in IDEAcases could award costs and witness fees for state due process
hearings under Sections 1821(b) and 1920. See Goldring, 416 F.3d at 77
n.4; Neosho R-V Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d at 1031-32. Both opinions
disregard the text of those provisions, whichapply only to proceedingsin
federal court. 28 U.S.C.1821(a)(2) (defining "court of the UnitedStates"
for the purpose of witness fees to include only federal and not state
courts); 28 U.S.C. 1920(permitting only a Judge or clerk of a federal
court to tax costs); 28 U.S.C. 451 (defining court of the United States);
see also NeoshoR-V Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d at 1034 (Pratt, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion on this ground). Goldring and Neoshoalso
overlook another consequenceof their holdings: Congress provided that
IDEAcases could be brought in state as well as federal court, 20 U.S.C.
1415(i)(A)(2), and it is by no meansclear that Sections 1821 and
authorize an award of costs in state courts. Underpetitioner’s argument
and the holdings in GoIdringand Neosho,the authorization for "costs" in
IDEAhas no independent meaning. That interpretation leaves parents in
state court IDEAcases potentially worse off than their federal
counterparts, who are at least entitled to the costs authorized under
Sections 1821 and 1920, while state court plaintiffs maybe left only
whatevercosts, if any, are authorized understate law.
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"a clearly acceptedmeaningin legislative and judicial practice"
that excludedawardsof expert costs. 499 U.S. at 88-94. Here,
the "legislative and judicial practice" cuts in the opposite
direction. All of the relevant legislative material confirmthat
Congress understood the term costs to include expert costs,
including the HouseReport, Senator Weicker’sfloor statement,
the Joint Statement, the GAOreporting requirement, and the
GAO’sReport. Even the Department of Education held that
view. Thesameis true of the "judicial practice" followingthe
HCPA’spassage. Courts uniformly understood the HCPAto
confer authority to awardthe costs of experts. See supraat II.A.
4. Moregenerally, the Congressthat enacted the HCPA
had
every reasonto think that courts wouldrespect its intentions as
madeplain in the legislative history. TheHCPA
wasenacted in
responseto Smithv. Robinson,whichrelied heavily on legislative
history to conclude that Congressintended IDEAto provide a
comprehensive remedial scheme. 468 U.S. at 1010-11. Chief
Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in Tatro (issued on the
same day as Smith) relied on IDEA’slegislative history in
construingthe scope of the Act’s exclusionof"medicalservices."
Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893; see also RoWley,458 U.S. at 192-98
(reviewing legislative history to determine what is an
"appropriate"education).Thus, for the Congressthat enactedthe
HCPA,
the notion that a reviewingcourt wouldshut its eyes to
the Joint Statement and other uncontroverted expressions of
intent in the legislative history to resolve any possible doubt
about the statute’s meaningwouldhave been alien.
5. Finally, the interpretative task in Caseywasdifferent from
the one here becauseSection 1988is a stand-alonecost-shifting
provision that applies to manycivil rights statutes. Thus, in
construing Section 1988, Casey could not follow the Court’s
general practice of lookingto related textual provisions to shed
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light on Section 1988’smeaning,but instead foundit necessary
to look at other statutes, enactedby other Congresses.Thatis not
tree here. As noted above, whenSection 1415(i)(3)(B)
examinedin the context of related provisions in both the HCPA
and IDEA,Congress’intent is clear.
IV. SpendingClause Considerations Do Not Affect
TheInterpretation Of Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
Petitioner and the United States argue that Section
1415(i)(3)(B)shouldbe construedto exclude expert costs
rules of interpretation applicableto SpendingClauselegislation.
Pet. Br. at 19-20; U.S. Br. at 13. Section1415(i)(3)(B)has
the law for twentyyears, but they cite no case involvingexpert
costs in whicha SpendingClauseargumentwas made,let alone
accepted. Nordid petitioner makea SpendingClause argument
in the lower courts. 33 There is goodreason whythis argument
wasnot raised before-- it is wrongandit is besidethe point.
It is wrongbecause the HCPA
wasenacted under Section 5
34 It is whollyinaccurateto say, as
of the FourteenthAmendment.

33 Petitioner has therefore forfeited this argument.See, e.g., TRW, Inc.
v. Andrews,534 U.S. 19, 34 (2001) (declining to reach question "not raised
or briefed below").
34 The HCPA
madethe Act’s cost-shifting provision retroactive to
cases pendingat the time this Court decidedSmith. In litigation over the
retroactivity provision’s constitutionality, the courts uniformlyrejected
Spending Clause claims because the HCPAprovided ample notice to
states and because it was enacted pursuant to Congress’ authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see, e.g., Fontenot v. La. Bd. of
Elementary& SecondaryEduc., 835 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1988), or pursuant
to Congress’ powerunder Section 5 and the SpendingClause. See, e.g.,
Mitten v. MuscogeeCounty Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 932 (1 lth Cir. 1989);
(continued...)
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does petitioner, that IDEAis exclusively a SpendingClause
statute. IDEAwas enacted under Section 5 as well. See 20
U.S.C. 1400(c)(6) (Congress enacted IDEA"to assure
protection of the law"). This Court has never held that Spending
Clauseprinciples cabin the interpretation of IDEA,and such a
ruling wouldbe at odds with manyof the Court’s prior IDEA
cases. See, e.g., Burlington,471U.S. at 369; Smith, 468U.S. at
1010-11; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180, 192-200.
Morefundamentally, the argumentis beside the point. The
SpendingClauserequires Congressto give states fair notice of
their fiscal obligationswhenthey acceptfederal funds.See, e.g.,
Gebserv. LagoVista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274(1998). The
HCPAdid just that. In the years following the HCPA’s
enactment, courts overwhelmingly interpreted Section
1415(i)(3)(B) as imposingan obligation on school boards
parents their costs, including the costs of experts, whenthey
prevailed. Noschool district objected to the awardof expert
costs on SpendingClausegrounds. Nor did petitioner Arlington
Central. The question here is not the adequacyof notice. The
question is whether now, twenty years after passage of the
HCPA,there is reason to question the judgment of the vast
majority of courts, the GAO,and even the UnitedStates, all of
whomconcludedthat Section 1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes courts
awardthe costs of experts to prevailing parents. Thereis none.

(...continued)
Counselv. Dow,849 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1988).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgmentbelowshould be
affirmed.
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